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Why Petrella v. MGM Guarantees Patentees Six Years Of Prefiling Damages
Dan Worleyi
I.

Introduction

This Comment examines and analyzes the impact of Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc.1 on the equitable defense of laches in patent law. The issue before the Supreme Court in
Petrella was “whether the equitable defense of laches (unreasonable, prejudicial delay in
commencing suit) may bar relief on a copyright infringement claim brought within § 507(b)’s
three-year limitation period.”2 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 6-3 majority, held that a defendant
cannot invoke the equitable defense of laches to preclude adjudication of a claim for copyright
infringement brought within the three-year window prescribed by Congress.3 The Court reasoned
that “[t]o the extent that an infringement suit seeks relief solely for conduct occurring within the
limitations period . . . courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of
suit.”4 Laches is not properly applied when a statute has a statute of limitations because laches is
a “gap-filling, not legislation-overriding” defense.5 Although Petrella only addressed the impact
of a statute of limitations on laches in copyright law and explicitly stated that it was not addressing
the Patent Act6, the decision casts doubt on the viability of laches in patent law.7

1

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
Id. at 1967.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 1974.
6
Id. at n.15.
7
Todd Vare, “Raging Bull” Copyright Opinion May Impact Patent Cases, LAW 360 (May 27, 2014 12:30PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/541533/raging-bull-copyright-opinion-may-impact-patent-cases (“Given the
similarity of [section 286 of the Patent Act and section 507(b) of the Copyright Act], the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Petrella may call into question the applicability of laches to patent infringement claims.”); Bill Donahue, “Raging
Bull” Will Be A Fight In The Patent Ring, LAW 360 (May 29, 2014, 1:00 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/542427/raging-bull-will-be-a-fight-in-the-patent-ring (noting that the Petrella
opinion “took a fairly settled situation in patent law and, at the very least, opened it up for debate”).
2

2

The leading case on the equitable defense of laches in patent law is A.C. Aukerman Co. v.
R.L. Chaides Construction Co.8 In Aukerman, the plaintiff-appellant, Aukerman, argued that
“where an express statute of limitations applies against a claim, laches cannot apply within the
limitations period.”9 The 9-1 en banc opinion, written by Chief Judge Nies, rejected the plaintiffappellant’s argument.10 In so rejecting, the court noted that “section 286 [of the Patent Act] is not
a statute of limitations in the sense of barring a suit for infringement.” 11 Rather, the effect of §
286 is to “limit recovery to damages for infringing acts committed within 6 years of the date of the
filing of the infringement action,” a process that is done “arbitrarily” and in the absence of any
other “impediment to recovery or maintenance of the suit such as application of the doctrine of
laches.”12 The Federal Circuit also rejected the plaintiff-appellant’s second argument that it was
improper to bar recovery for damages flowing from a continuing tort, such as patent
infringement.13 The court concluded that laches does not have to be established for each infringing
act because “continuous tortious acts may be deemed to constitute a unitary claim.”14 Importantly,
the court based its decision on the apparent conflict with Supreme Court precedent in which laches
had been applied against continuing torts.15 Part II of this Comment will summarize the equitable
defense of laches in patent law and will further analyze the Aukerman decision.16
The remainder of the Comment will focus on the impact of the Petrella decision. Part III
will develop the facts of Petrella and explain how the combination of a federally prescribed statute

8

A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
Id. at 1030 (emphasis in original).
10
Id. (“We are unpersuaded that section 286 [of the Patent Act] should be interpreted to preclude the defense of
laches and provide, in effect, a guarantee of six years damages regardless of equitable considerations arising from
delay in assertion of one’s rights.”).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 1031.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See infra Part II.
9
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of limitations and the separate-accrual rule in copyright law has effectively erased the equitable
defense of laches from the copyright lexicon.17 Part IV will discuss SCA Hygiene Products
Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC,18 the Federal Circuit’s first opinion subsequent
to Petrella involving the application of the equitable defense of laches in patent law.19 Part V will
argue that the Federal Circuit in SCA Hygiene incorrectly interpreted Petrella and will explain why
the Petrella opinion will inevitably impact patent law.20 Part V will also argue that § 286 of the
Patent Act, although not a claim-barring statute of limitations, is still a timeframe prescribed by
Congress that will be impacted by the Petrella.21 Lastly, Part V argues that Petrella guarantees
patentees six years of prefiling damages because patent infringement is a continuing tort that,
similar to copyright infringement, applies the separate-accrual rule.22 Part VI will conclude this
Comment by arguing that SCA Hygiene should be taken up by the en banc Federal Circuit or,
alternatively, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in order to reject the continuing viability
of the equitable defense of laches in patent law for barring damages incurred within six years of
filing suit.23

II.

The Equitable Defense Of Laches In Patent Law

This part of the Comment will provide a general overview of the equitable defense of laches
in patent law. Part A will summarize how a defendant may utilize laches as a defense to a claim

17

See infra Part III.
SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, No. 2013-1564, 2014 US App. LEXIS 17830
(Fed. Cir. Sep. 17, 2014).
19
See infra Part IV
20
See infra Part V.
21
See infra Part V.
22
See infra Part V.
23
See infra Part VI.
18
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for patent infringement. Part B will analyze Aukerman, the leading case on the application of
laches in patent law. Part C will summarize the precedential effect of Aukerman.

A. Overview Of The Equitable Defense Of Laches

Section 282 of the Patent Act is the statutory basis for the equitable defense of laches.24
Although the text does not explicitly provide for the defense of laches,25 the application of laches
to a claim of patent infringement “was well established at the time of recodification of the patent
laws in 1952.”26 The commentary of one of the drafters of the Patent Act of 1952 confirms
Congress’ intention to retain the defense of laches.27 The first paragraph of § 282 of the Patent
Act “include[s] ‘equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and unclean hands.’”28
Laches was initially a defense to a patent-infringement action brought in equity.29 As
previously stated, laches extended into suits at law and was a well-established defense to a claim
of patent infringement when the patent laws were recodified in 1952.30 In the legal context, laches
is defined as “the neglect or delay in bringing suit to remedy an alleged wrong, which taken
together with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party and
operates as an equitable bar.”31 Since laches was, and remains to be, equitable in nature, its

24

The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). (“Laches is cognizable under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988) as an equitable defense to a claim
for patent infringement.”).
25
The relevant statutory language of § 282 cited by Aukerman reads: “The following shall be defenses in any action
involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for
infringement, or unenforceability.” Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1029 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 282).
26
Id.
27
Id. (citing P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Law, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 55 (West 1954)).
28
Id. (quoting J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd. Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed Cir. 1984)).
29
Id. at 1028.
30
Id. at 1029.
31
Id. at 1028–29.
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determination is “committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and the trial judge’s
discretion is reviewed by [the Federal Circuit] under the abuse of discretion standard.”32
In order to establish the equitable defense of laches, the defendant must establish two
elements: (1) the patentee’s delay in bringing the patent-infringement action was “unreasonable
and inexcusable;” and (2) the defendant “suffered material prejudice attributable to the delay.”33
A district court should consider these two elements and “all of the evidence and other
circumstances to determine whether equity should intercede to bar pre-filing damages.”34 Thus, if
the defendant successfully establishes these two elements, “the patentee’s claim for damages prior
to suit may be barred.”35
There is no specific duration of time that a court may determine is per se unreasonable
when attempting to determine the first element to establish laches.36 However, if a patentee delays
bringing suit “more than six years after the date the patentee knew or should have known of the
alleged infringer’s activity,” a presumption of laches arises.37 If there is a presumption of laches,
it shifts the burden of production38 to the plaintiff, but it does not shift the burden of persuasion.39
A patentee’s delay in bringing suit is measured from “the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably
should have known of the defendant’s alleged infringing activities to the date of the suit.”40 Thus,
the first element only looks at the actions of the plaintiff.

32

Id. at 1028.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 1032 (“The length of time which may be deemed unreasonable has no fixed boundaries but rather depends
on the circumstances.”).
37
Id. at 1028.
38
The burden of production is defined as “[a] party's duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue
decided by the fact-finder, rather than decided against the party in a peremptory ruling such as a summary judgment
or a directed verdict.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
39
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028. The burden of persuasion is defined as “[a] party's duty to convince the fact-finder
to view the facts in a way that favors that party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
40
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032.
33
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There are two types of material prejudice that may be used to satisfy the second element of
the laches defense, economic prejudice and evidentiary prejudice.41 The first type, evidentiary
prejudice, may arise because a defendant may not be able to present a full and fair defense on the
merits due to lack of available evidence.42 Examples of evidentiary prejudice are “the loss of
records, the death of a witness, or the unreliability of memories of long past events.”43 Evidentiary
prejudice undermines the ability of the court to fairly assess the facts of the case. 44 The second
type of material prejudice is economic prejudice.45 Economic prejudice considers the “change in
the economic position of the alleged infringer during the period of delay.”46 Examples of economic
prejudice may include situations where “a defendant and possibly others will suffer the loss of
monetary investments or incur damages which likely would have been prevented by an earlier
suit.”47 Either type of prejudice may be sufficient to establish the second element of the laches
defense.48
Despite the lack of explicit statutory guidance, the Federal Circuit has concluded that it had
“no difficulty in reading section 286 harmoniously with the recognition under section 282 of the
laches defense.”49 The following subpart will analyze the facts and holding of the en banc
Aukerman opinion, which has served as the basis for the application of laches in patent law since
it was decided in 1992.

B. Analysis of Aukerman.

41

Id. at 1033.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. (emphasis in original)
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1030.
42
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Plaintiff-appellant Aukerman initiated a patent-infringement suit against the defendant,
Chaides, for the alleged infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 3,793,133 and 4,014,633.50 The patentsin-suit related to “a method and device for forming concrete highway barriers capable of separating
highway surfaces of different elevations.”51 In 1977, Aukerman entered into a license agreement
with Gomaco Corp., which made Gomaco a licensee of Aukerman’s patents and required Gomaco
to notify Aukerman of companies who purchased Gomaco’s product. 52 Chaides subsequently
purchased Gomaco’s product, and Gomaco informed Aukerman of Chaides’ purchase.53
Upon receiving the notification of Chaides’ purchase, Aukerman’s counsel advised
Chaides, by a letter dated February 13, 1979, that Chaides’ use of Gomaco’s product “raised ‘a
question of infringement with respect to one or more of [Aukerman’s patents-in-suit]’ and offered
Chaides a license.”54 Correspondence between Aukerman and Chaides continued for two months
and concluded with Chaides stating Aukerman should sue them “for $200-$300 a year.”55
Although the opinion does not make it clear, this $200-$300 figure was likely based on Chaides’
estimation of the damages based on the size of Chaides’ business. After Chaides’ letter, “[t]here
was no further correspondence or contact between the parties for more than eight years.”56
In 1987, Aukerman became aware that Chaides had become a “substantial competitor”
utilizing the patents-in-suit.57 This prompted Aukerman’s counsel to send another letter to Chaides
on October 22, 1987, which threatened litigation.58 Both parties remained silent until August 2,

50

Id. at 1026.
Id. (emphasis deleted).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1026–27.
56
Id. at 1027.
57
Id.
58
Id.
51
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1988 when Aukerman’s counsel again wrote Chaides and explained more fully Aukerman’s
proposed licensing offer.59 Chaides did not respond to the August 2, 1988 letter.60 Aukerman then
filed the present action with the district court on October 26, 1988.61
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary
judgment to the defendant Chaides, holding that “the doctrine of laches and estoppel barred
Aukerman’s claims for relief.”62 The court ruled determined that Aukerman’s delay of more than
six years “shifted the burden to Aukerman to prove that its delay was reasonable and was not
prejudicial to Chaides.”63 The court rejected Aukerman’s arguments that the delay was reasonable
because Aukerman was involved in other litigation and Chaides’ infringement was de minimis.64
On appeal, the panel decision of the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case back
to the district court because, in its view, which the en banc decision subsequently rendered
erroneous,65 the district court “erred in placing the burden on Aukerman to rebut the presumption
[of laches] rather than on Chaides to prove its equitable defenses.”66 The panel’s decision was
vacated and withdrawn when the Federal Circuit granted a rehearing en banc.67
The Federal Circuit reheard the case en banc “to reconsider the principles of laches and
equitable estoppel in a patent infringement suit.”68 The plaintiff-appellant Aukerman made two
arguments at the Federal Circuit, each of which will be addressed in turn below.

59

Id.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1027.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1028.
66
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Co., No. 90-1137, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *27 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 1991).
67
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Co., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11706 (Fed. Cir May 22, 1991) (en banc).
68
Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026.
60
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1.Aukerman’s First Argument: The Recognition Of Laches Conflicts
With § 286 Of The Patent Act.

First, Aukerman argued that “the defense of laches is inapplicable, as a matter of law,
against a claim for damages in patent infringement suits.”69

Aukerman reasoned that the

“recognition of laches as a defense conflicts with 35 U.S.C. § 286” because § 286 “is comparable
to a statute of limitations which effectively preempts the laches defense.”70 Section 286 provides,
in relevant part: “Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any
infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim
for infringement in the action.”71 Importantly, the language of the statute has not changed since
the Federal Circuit decided Aukerman.72 According to Aukerman’s argument, if § 286 were
interpreted to be a statute of limitations, laches could not be applied.73
The Federal Circuit not only rejected Aukerman’s argument that § 286 was the type of
statute of limitations would make laches inapplicable, but it also rejected Aukerman’s position that
laches cannot operate within a window created by a statute of limitations.74 First, as a threshold
matter, the court found that even if § 286 were an express statute of limitations, “laches is routinely
applied within the prescribed statute of limitations period for bringing the claim.”75 However, the
court found that § 286 was “not a statute of limitations in the sense of barring a suit for
infringement.”76 Rather, “the effect of section 286 is to limit recovery to damages for infringing

69

Id. at 1029.
Id.
71
35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012).
72
See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1029 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1988)).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1030.
75
Id. (listing examples where laches has been to claims brought within the prescribed statute of limitations period).
76
Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754 F.2d 345, 347–48 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
70
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acts committed within six years of the date of the filing of the infringement action.”77 The Federal
Circuit explained that § 286 functions by counting backwards six years from the date of the
complaint to limit pre-filing damages, a process that is done “arbitrarily.”78 The recovery within
this six years “assumes . . . no other impediment to recovery or maintenance of the suit such as
application of the doctrine of laches.”79 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit was “unpersuaded that
section 286 should be interpreted to preclude the defense of laches and provide, in effect, a
guarantee of six years damages regardless of equitable considerations arising from delay in
assertion of one’s rights.”80
The Federal Circuit relied primarily on circuit precedent, the language of the statute, and
legislative history when it determined that § 286 was not a true statute of limitations. First, the
court relied on the fact that the patent statute from 1870-1874 “contained an actual statute of
limitations, which required ‘all actions for the infringement of patents shall be brought during the
term for which letters patent shall be granted or extended, or within six years after the expiration
thereof.’” 81 Although not explicitly stated by the court, it is reasonable to infer that since a true
claim-barring statute is no longer present, Congress did not consider § 286 to be a statute of
limitations because it knew how to write a claim-barring statute but elected not to do so when
enacting § 286. Second, the court stated that “[w]ithout exception, all circuits recognized laches
as a defense to a charge of patent infringement despite the reenactment of the damages limitation
[§ 286] in the 1952 statute.”82 Thus, according to the Federal Circuit, precedent and legislative
history mandated the finding that laches can apply to § 286 of the Patent Act.

77

Id.
Id.
79
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80
Id.
81
Id. at n.8 (quoting 16 Stat. 206, § 55 (July 8, 1870)).
82
Id.
78
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Although the Federal Circuit grounded its decision in legislative history and circuit
precedent, the court concluded that it had “no difficulty in reading section 286 harmoniously with
the recognition under section 282 of the laches defense” even when “looked at afresh.”83 The court
reasoned that through § 286, “Congress imposed an arbitrary limitation on the period for which
damages may be awarded on any claim for patent infringement.”84 The court further reasoned that
since laches “invokes the discretionary power of the district court to limit the defendant’s liability
for infringement by reason of the equities between the parties,” recognition of the defense would
not “affect the general enforceability of the patent against others or the presumption of its validity
under section 282.”85 Lastly, the court summarized that “[n]othing in section 286 suggests that
Congress intended by reenactment of this damage limitation to eliminate the long recognized
defense of laches or to take away a district court’s equitable powers in connection with patent
cases.”86

The Federal Circuit concluded, contrary to Aukerman’s position, that a court’s

discretionary powers under § 282 and the arbitrary limitation in § 286 do not conflict with one
another.87

2.Aukerman’s Second Argument: Laches Is An Improper Defense To
Completely Bar Recovery Of Prefiling Damages From A Continuing
Tort, Such As Patent Infringement

83

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
85
Id. (emphasis in original).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1030–31.
84
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Aukerman’s second argument stated that “it is improper to utilize laches as a defense to
completely bar recovery of prefiling damages flowing from a continuing tort, such as patent
infringement.”88 The basis for Aukerman’s argument is that since each act of patent infringement
is deemed a separate claim, the laches defense must be established separately for each and every
act of infringement.89 The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, and noted that “Aukerman’s theory
conflicts with the precedent of the Supreme Court in which laches has been applied against
continuing torts.”90
In rejecting Aukerman’s argument, the court reasoned that laches is “a single defense to a
continuing tort up to the time of the suit, not a series of individual defenses which must be proved
as to each act of infringement, at least with respect to infringing acts of the same nature.” 91 With
respect to laches, “continuing tortious acts may be deemed to constitute a unitary claim.” 92 The
Federal Circuit subsequently reaffirmed its ruling in Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, 726 F.2d 734
(Fed Cir. 1984) and held that “laches is available as a defense to a suit for patent infringement.”93
As a result, the court rejected Aukerman’s second argument and concluded that laches could bar
his claim.94

C. Effect Of Aukerman

88

Id. at 1031.
Id.
90
Id. (citing Supreme Court cases involving patent infringement and trademark infringement).
91
Id.
92
Id. Patent infringement is a continuing tort because each act of infringement is a separate claim. Id. See Part
III.B. infra for a further discussion of continuing torts.
93
Id. at 1032.
94
Id.
89

13

Aukerman has been the leading case on the application of laches in patent law for over
twenty-two years; however, as the next part of this Comment will explain, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Petrella casts doubt on the long-term viability of Aukerman. The petitioner in
Petrella made essentially the same arguments made by Aukerman, and fortunately for Petrella,
the Supreme Court found in her favor. While there are some differences between patent law and
copyright law,95 Part V of this Comment will explain that these differences are not so substantial
that Petrella will not impact patent law. Despite the differences between patent law and
copyright law, the broad language of the Court in Petrella will inevitably impact patent law and
the precedential value of Aukerman.

III.

The Impact Of Petrella On Copyright Law

This part will go through the facts and holding of Petrella and will subsequently explain
the impact of the opinion on the defense of laches in copyright law. The facts of the case are
relevant to give context to the Court’s analysis. Similarly, it is important to understand the Court’s
reasoning in order to appreciate why Petrella will extend into patent law. Part A will summarize
the relevant facts of Petrella. Part B will analyze the Court’s reasoning in Petrella.

A. Facts Of Petrella

95

Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Defies Supreme Court in Laches Holding, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 21, 2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/federal-supreme-holding.html (noting that the copyright statute of limitations is
more direct and the three-year limitation is a much lower percentage of the overall copyright term).
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The copyrighted work at issue was a screenplay based on the life of former boxing
champion Jake LaMotta.96 The screenplay, which was registered in 1963, is one of three
copyrighted works that was made by LaMotta and his longtime friend Frank Petrella.97 In 1976,
the duo assigned their rights in the three works, including the renewal rights, to a company that
was later acquired by MGM.98 In 1980, MGM released the infringing work, a motion picture
entitled Raging Bull.99 Frank Petrella subsequently died in 1981, ten years before the initial
copyright expired.100 Under 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(C)(ii)-(iv), Paula Petrella inherited the renewal
rights.101 And under the Supreme Court’s holding in Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990), MGM
may only continue to use the copyrighted work if Paula Petrella transferred the renewal rights to
them.102 She did not transfer the renewal rights, but MGM continued “to market the film, and has
converted it into formats unimagined in 1980, including DVD and Blu-ray.”103
In 1991, Paula Petrella timely renewed the copyright, but she did not contact MGM until
1998.104 Petrella’s attorney and MGM disputed the validity of the copyright-infringement claims
for the next two years.105 Petrella did not file suit until nine years later.106
On January 6, 2009, the petitioner, Paula Petrella, filed a copyright-infringement action in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California.107 Petrella sought monetary

96

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1970 (2014).
Id. The copyrights in the other two works were not timely renewed, so they are not at issue in this case. Id. at
1971.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1968.
102
Id. (“[I]f an author who has assigned her rights away dies before the renewal period, then the assignee may
continue to use the original work to produce a derivative work only if the author’s successor transfers the renewal
rights to the assignee.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103
Id. at 1971.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
97
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and injunctive relief from MGM for its alleged violation of her copyright.108 Petrella only sought
relief for “acts of infringement occurring on or after January 6, 2006,” which is exactly three years
prior to the date she filed suit.109 MGM moved for summary judgment on several grounds,
including the equitable defense of laches.110
The district court granted MGM’s motion, reasoning that MGM was prejudiced by
Petrella’s delay in bringing suit.111 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the laches-based dismissal.112 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to
“resolve a conflict among the Circuits on the application of the equitable defense of laches to
copyright infringement claims brought within the three-year look-back period prescribed by
Congress.”113

B. Analysis Of Petrella

The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Ninth Circuit because the Ninth Circuit
failed “to recognize that the copyright statute of limitations, § 507(b), itself takes account of
delay.”114 The Court noted that the statute of limitations in combination with the separate-accrual
rule attending § 507(b) allows the copyright owner to recover damages within the three-year lookback period prescribed in § 507(b).115 Accordingly, the Court held that laches “cannot be invoked
to preclude adjudication of a claim for damages brought within the three-year window” prescribed

108

Id.
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 1971–72.
112
Id. at 1972.
113
Id. (noting the circuit split).
114
Id. at 1973.
115
Id.
109
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by Congress.116 The Court reasoned that “courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment
on the timeliness of suit” when a copyright owner “seeks relief solely for conduct occurring within
the limitations period.”117
The Copyright Act did not include a statute of limitations for civil suits until 1957.118 Prior
to 1957, courts used analogous state statutes of limitations for determining the timeliness of suit.119
Those courts also occasionally invoked laches to abridge the state-law prescription.120 According
to the Court, this is permissible because those courts were “merely filling a legislative hole.”121 In
1957, however, Congress “addressed the matter and filled the hole” by enacting § 507(b) of the
Copyright Act, which reads: “No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title
unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”122 Subsequent to the enactment
of a statute of limitations, laches could no longer be properly applied.
A copyright infringement claim “ordinarily accrues when a plaintiff has a complete and
present cause of action.”123 According to the Court, “[i]t is widely recognized that the separateaccrual rule attends the copyright statute of limitations.”124 This means that the statute of
limitations runs separately from each act of infringement.125 Thus, “each time an infringing work
is reproduced or distributed, the infringer commits a new wrong.”126 Accordingly, under § 507(b),

116

Id. at 1967.
Id.
118
Id. at 1968.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. (quoting Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. V. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 881 (2d
Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122
Id. at 1968–69 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012)).
123
Id. at 1969 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
Id. (citations omitted).
125
Id.
126
Id.
117
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each infringing act is actionable for up to three years because the statute provides recovery for
claims “commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”127
Laches may only be applied in “extraordinary circumstances.”128 The Petrella Court noted
two cases in which there might be “extraordinary circumstances” that would warrant the invocation
of laches: (1) Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007); and (2) New Era
Publications Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).129 In Chirco, the Sixth Circuit
held that the requested relief would be inequitable for two separate reasons.130 First, the plaintiffs
knew of the defendant’s plan to create an allegedly infringing work and failed to take readily
available measures to stop them.131 Second, the plaintiff’s requested relief “would work an unjust
hardship upon the defendants and innocent third parties.”132 While these two examples of
extraordinary circumstances are by no means exhaustive, the statute of limitations “leaves little
place for a doctrine that would further limit the timeliness of a copyright owner’s suit.”133
In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, Petrella instructs that laches should not be
applied to a claim for copyright infringement brought within the three-year window prescribed by
Congress.134 Laches is a “gap-filling, not legislation-overriding defense.”135 If courts were able
to individually determine the timeliness of suit, it would “tug against the uniformity Congress
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sought to achieve when it enacted § 507(b).”136 Subsequent to Petrella, the equitable defense of
laches applies only to “claims of an equitable cast for which the Legislature has provided to fixed
time limitation.”137

IV.

Current Status Of Laches In Patent Law Subsequent To Petrella: SCA Hygiene v.
First Quality.

On September 17, 2014, Circuit Judge Hughes, writing for a unanimous panel also
including Circuit Judges Reyna and Wallach, concluded that Petrella did not compel a finding that
Aukerman was no longer good law and that laches was still applicable to the Patent Act.138 This
decision represents the Federal Circuit’s first opportunity to address Petrella, but the panel failed
to deviate from Federal Circuit precedent. The court noted that footnote 15 of the Petrella
decision, which stated that the Supreme Court “had not had occasion to review the Federal
Circuit’s position [in Aukerman],”139 left the en banc Aukerman decision intact.140 The Federal
Circuit thus concluded that it was bound by Aukerman until the issue was decided by the Supreme
Court or the Federal Circuit en banc.141
As will be explained in Part V infra, the Federal Circuit failed to understand the clear
import of the Petrella decision.142 Part V will explain why the SCA Hygiene decision erred in its
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analysis of the Petrella opinion, which contains broad language that will impact patent law. The
Federal Circuit should have taken the opportunity to correct the injustice to patentees that
Aukerman has caused for the past twenty-two years.

V.

Reasons Why Petrella Will Impact Patent Law

This part will argue that the Federal Circuit in SCA Hygiene incorrectly interpreted Petrella
and will explain why the Petrella opinion will impact patent law. Although, as the Federal Circuit
in SCA Hygiene correctly points out, the majority opinion in Petrella explicitly stated that it “had
not had occasion to review the Federal Circuit’s position [in Aukerman],”143 the breadth of the
language in Petrella is too expansive for laches to survive in patent law. The paragraphs below
further explain why the broad language in Petrella will allow patentees to recover six years of
prefiling damages because laches cannot apply to bar the legal relief explicitly prescribed by
Congress in § 286. Part A will explain why § 286 is also a statute of limitations that will be
impacted by Petrella. Part B will discuss the separate-accrual rule attendant in both patent and
copyright infringement. Part C will show why public policy supports allowing patentees to recover
six years of prefiling damages, regardless of the laches defense.

A. Section 286 Of The Patent Act Is A Statute Of Limitations That Will Be
Impacted By Petrella
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The Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Aukerman is directly contradicted by the broad language
in Petrella. The plaintiff-appellant in Aukerman made essentially the same argument that carried
the day in Petrella.144 The Federal Circuit rejected Aukerman’s argument that laches could not be
applied in the presence of a statute of limitations for two reasons.145 First, the Federal Circuit
stated that “laches is routinely applied within the prescribed statute of limitations period for
bringing the claim.”146 This is directly contradictory to the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement
that it was not aware of any case in which it “approved the application of laches to bar a claim for
damages brought within the time allowed by a federal statute of limitations.”147 The Federal
Circuit’s second, alternative reasoning was its attempt to distinguish § 286 by stating that “section
286 is not a statute of limitations in the sense of barring a suit for infringement.” 148 Despite the
Federal Circuit’s characterization of § 286 as “arbitrary,”149 the six-year period is still a limitation
on damages.

In § 286, Congress explicitly stated that “no recovery shall be had for any

infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim
for infringement in the action.”150 The Petrella Court also rejected this type of reasoning when it
noted that “in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to
bar legal relief.”151 Central to the Supreme Court’s holding was the “ongoing separation of legal
and equitable remedies.”152 Since § 286 of the Patent Act is a statute of limitations, as will be
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explained in further detail below, the Federal Circuit in SCA Hygiene incorrectly determined that
Petrella did not apply and that the Aukerman decision remains good law.
The Court in Petrella could not have been clearer that the Federal Circuit’s first line of
reasoning, that laches may be applied within a timeframe prescribed by a statute of limitations,
was faulty. In fact, the Court explicitly stated in the first paragraph of its opinion that “[t]o the
extent that an infringement suit seeks relief solely for conduct occurring within the limitations
period . . . courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.”153 The
Court later reasoned that this is because a statute of limitations “itself takes account of delay.”154
Since laches is a “gap-filling, not legislation-overriding” device, laches is not properly applied
when a statute has a statute of limitations.155

Thus, Petrella has directly and completely

undermined the Federal Circuit’s first line of reasoning from Aukerman.
While the Federal Circuit’s second line of reasoning was more involved and may appear
to have more merit, it is also completely undermined by Petrella. As the Federal Circuit correctly
observed, § 286 of the Patent Act is not a statute of limitations, in that it does not bar a suit for
infringement.156 However, it is still a statute of limitations because Congress has prescribed a sixyear limitation on damages.157 In fact, the Federal Circuit itself recognized that § 286 is still a type
of statute of limitations when it stated that “section 286 is not a statute of limitations in the sense
of barring a suit for infringement.”158 By recognizing that § 286 was not a statute of limitations
“in the sense of barring a suit for infringement,” the court is implicitly stating that it is still a statute
of limitations, though in a different sense. In light of Congress’ decision to enact § 286, the
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application of the equitable defense of laches by the courts would improperly override the intent
of the statute by “setting a time limit other than the one Congress prescribed.” 159 As stated by
Petrella, “in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to
bar legal relief.”160 Section 286 is a statute of limitations, no matter which “sense” the Federal
Circuit would like to view it in, so courts should not be able to apply laches to limit a patentee
from collecting six years of prefiling damages. Even though the Patent Act does not have a statute
of limitations that bars the suit entirely (as in § 507(b) of the Copyright Act), a court cannot elect
to fill the “legislative hole” and invoke laches to bar the suit when doing so would bar the six years
of legal relief explicitly provided for by Congress when it enacted § 286.
Section 286 of the Patent Act161 and § 507(b) of the Copyright Act162 both represent
statutory windows created by Congress to limit recovery by the owner of the intellectual property.
Although § 507(b) of the Copyright Act limits all relief, both legal and equitable and § 286 of the
Patent Act only limits legal relief, the two statutes are nonetheless statutorily-prescribed
limitations. In both statutes, Congress created a window for the recovery of legal relief, a window
in which the courts should not attempt to close with equitable remedies.163 The following timelines
demonstrate the operation of both statutes:

Copyright Infringement - § 507(b):
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Initial Infringement

3-Year Window Created
By § 507(b) (legal and
equitable relief)

Copyright-Infringement
Action

6-Year Window Created
By § 286 (legal relief
only)

Patent-Infringement
Action

Patent Infringement - § 286:

Initial Infringement

Section 507(b) “bars relief of any kind for conduct occurring prior to the three-year limitations
period.”164 Section 286 does not bar “relief of any kind,” but does “limit recovery to damages for
infringing acts committed within six years of the date of the filing of the infringement action.”165
As the timelines illustrate, the function of the two statutes is the same – to limit the recovery of the
claimant. For copyright infringement, an alleged infringer may infringe at any point within the
orange box labeled “initial infringement,” but the copyright owner can seek relief of any kind for
infringements occurring within the three-year window created by § 507(b), as depicted by the
green box. Similarly for patent infringement, an alleged infringer may initially infringe at any
point within the orange box, but a patentee can only bring suit for damages within the 6-year
window created by § 286, as depicted by the green box.
Both statutes represent an express decision by Congress to limit the amount of legal relief
available to an owner of intellectual property, six years for patent owners and three years for a
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copyright owner.166 Admittedly, § 507(b) also limits equitable remedies; however, it also limits
legal relief. An important element of the Court’s holding was “the ongoing separation of legal and
equitable remedies.”167 As stated by the majority in Petrella, the “principal application [of laches]
was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast for which the Legislature has provided no fixed
time limitation.”168 Invoking the equitable defense of laches to bar legal relief would improperly
constrict the six-year window in § 286 of the Patent Act and would set “a time limit other than the
one Congress prescribed.”169 The Petrella opinion is not limited to “true” statutes of limitations,
which bar all forms of relief, both legal and equitable. The Court made this clear when it stated
that the Court “adhere[s] to the position that, in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by
Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief.”170 The Federal Circuit cannot sidestep
Petrella by invoking laches to bar the entire suit or any equitable remedies because the Patent
Act’s statute of limitations is only directed toward legal relief. This is because invoking laches
would bar the six years of legal relief explicitly provided for by Congress when it enacted § 286.
Thus, applying laches against a claim for damages in a patent-infringement suit would
impermissibly bar a patentee’s claim for legal relief, which is in direct opposition to both the statute
and Petrella.

B. The Separate-Accrual Rule Links Patent And Copyright Infringement
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The separate-accrual rule, which applies to both patent infringement171 and copyright
infringement172 further demonstrates § 286 of the Patent Act and § 507(b) of the Copyright Act
should be treated similarly. The separate-accrual rule states that “when a defendant commits
successive violations, the statute of limitations runs separately from each violation.”173 Thus,
“[e]ach wrong gives rise to a discrete ‘claim’ that ‘accrues’ at the time the wrong occurs.” 174
Applying this to the above timelines, any infringement that occurs within the orange box is outside
of recovery for the plaintiff, but since both patent infringement and copyright infringement are
continuing torts175 that apply the separate-accrual rule, all violations occurring within the green
boxes of the timelines can be recovered by the plaintiff because each claim separately accrues.176
Thus, recovery of damages for infringements that accrue within the green box is consistent with
the language of § 286, which provides that “no recovery shall be had for any infringement
committed for than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement
in the action.”177
As noted by Petrella, it is the combination of the separate-accrual rule and the three-year
window created by § 507(b) of the Copyright Act, that entitled Petrella to damages.178 The
plaintiff-appellant in Aukerman made this exact argument, but unfortunately for Aukerman, the
Federal Circuit rejected it.179 Importantly, Aukerman, which predated Petrella, did not have the
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benefit of the Petrella opinion to guide its reasoning.180 Petrella would have supplied the requisite
Supreme Court precedent to support plaintiff-appellant Aukerman’s argument. Thus, the separateaccrual rule further illustrates why § 286 of the Patent Act and § 507(b) of the Copyright Act
should be treated similarly.

C. Public Policy Also Supports Guaranteeing Six Years Of Prefiling Damages

In addition to the text of the statute and black letter law, public policy also guided the
Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella.181 The Court in Petrella noted that “[i]t is hardly incumbent
on copyright owners . . . to challenge each and every actionable infringement.” 182 The Court
reasoned that some infringements may actually benefit the copyright owner and that “there is
nothing untoward about waiting to see whether an infringer’s exploitation undercuts the value of
the copyrighted work, has no effect on the original work, or even compliments it.”183 Even in
situations where the infringement is potentially harmful, “the harm may be too small to justify the
cost of litigation.”184
Similarly in patent law, in the absence of laches, a patentee has no duty to exploit or enforce
his patent rights. Just as in copyright law, some patent infringements may be beneficial to the
patent owner. For example, a patentee may have a patent over a wireless mouse. A laptop
computer manufacturer with a very small market share may manufacture and sell a laptop
computer with the USB-attachment required to use the patentee’s mouse embedded within the
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laptop itself but not the mouse itself. This would likely cause consumers to purchase the patentee’s
mouse because they would not have to occupy an external USB port for the use of a different
wireless mouse. In this example, the laptop computer manufacturer infringed the patent, but it
also expanded the market for the patentee’s wireless mouse, which is beneficial to the patentee
because the patentee will be able to sell more of its patented product. Public policy would not
support requiring this patentee to enforce its patent.
Also, the extreme expense associated with patent litigation supports the conclusion that a
patentee should not be forced to enforce his patents. In its 2013 Report of the Economic Survey,
the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) estimated that a patent-infringement
suit with less than $1 million at stake cost $350 thousand dollars through the end of discovery and
$700 thousand through the end of trial.185 Obviously, if the cost of litigation is $700 thousand, it
would not make financial sense to challenge small infringements that might be harmful. This is
especially true since the $700 thousand figure does not represent the cost of appeal.
The separate-accrual rule in combination with the six-year limitation on damages provided
in § 286 of the Patent Act allows Petrella to extend into patent law. If Petrella had been decided
before Aukerman, it is likely that the Federal Circuit would have agreed with the arguments made
by Aukerman and concluded that laches cannot prevent a patentee from recovering six years of
prefiling damages.

Public policy and Supreme Court precedent support this conclusion.

Subsequent to Petrella, a patentee should be guaranteed damages for the most recent six years as
a result of the separate-accrual rule in combination with the statute of limitations prescribed by
Congress in § 286 of the Patent Act.
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VI.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court should grant certiorari on the SCA Hygiene case because, as this
Comment explained in Part V, the Petrella decision will inevitably impact patent jurisprudence.
Alternatively, the Federal Circuit should be proactive and rehear the SCA Hygiene case en banc.
This could spare the Federal Circuit another “slap”186 from the Supreme Court, and avoid another
Supreme Court opinion stating that the Federal Circuit “fundamentally misunderstands”187 the
Supreme Court’s precedent. Either way, it is important that lower courts understand the clear
implications of the Petrella decision.
It is unjust for patentees who have waited to sue longer than six years to be barred from
recovery under § 286 of the Patent Act by laches when the Supreme Court in Petrella made clear
that “in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar
legal relief.”188 Since patent infringement and copyright infringement are continuing torts that
apply the separate-accrual rule and there is a statute of limitations in both the Patent Act and the
Copyright Act, laches should be applied in the same way, regardless of the intellectual property at
issue. Therefore, to avoid injustice to patentees, the Federal Circuit should rehear the SCA Hygiene
case en banc or the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to explicitly overrule Aukerman and
affirmatively establish that patentees are guaranteed six years of prefiling damages under § 286 of
the Patent Act.
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